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Dec. 2003Edition 52

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Sixteen Key Principles Shaping
American Foreign Policy

by Gordon Neal Diem, D.A.

Primary Associate, ADVANCE Education and Development Institute 1106 Arnette Avenue, Durham, North Carolina 27707

Introduction to the Text

The focus and content of a text on "American Foreign Policy" is the parochial, self-centered, often selfish, interests of the United States in the world of nations.  If the text was titled "International Relations," the focus and content would be on the U. S. effort to cooperate with and "get along with" the other nations of the world.  Because the text is titled "American Foreign Policy," the  text  focuses on efforts by the U. S. to achieve its own national objectives and to further and enhance itself, sometimes at the expense of other nations, nationalities, interests, and groups. This primer, American Foreign Policy I, focuses on the sixteen key principles upon which American foreign policy appears to be built. For a discussion of American foreign policy history, please go to American Foreign Policy II: A Brief History of American Foreign Policy.

The United States bases its pursuit of specific foreign policy objectives on a variety of justifying principles;  these "key principles of American foreign policy" are the focus of this text.  Most foreign policy decisions incorporate several of the principles, each principle adding its portion to shaping the final foreign policy decision.  Most of the key principles of American foreign policy have their origin with the founding of the nation.  Quotes from Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century American statesmen document the history of many of these principles.

Sixteen Key Principles of American Foreign Policy

Basic Approaches to American Foreign Policy

Throughout more than 200 years of American foreign policy history, American foreign policy undergoes a variety of changes. First, American foreign policy  toward individual nations changes over the course of 200 years.  For example, during some time periods, England, France, Germany, Mexico and Japan are America's sworn enemies and the recipient of American military action; during other time periods, these same nations are America’s allies, and in some cases, military partners in American military actions directed toward other nations.  Second, American reliance on specific instruments of foreign policy changes.  For example, during some time periods, America  relies on military power; during other time periods America relies on geographic isolation, economic power, diplomacy, international alliances, or cultural superiority.  Third, American emphasis on individual foreign policy  justifications changes.  For example, during some time periods, America  justifies foreign policy decisions on the call for "balance of power;" during other time periods, justifications are based on "national security," "geopolitics," "freedom of the seas," or nearly a dozen other principles deemed relevant at the time.

America's initial interests in neutrality and in commercial respect following the American revolution leads to the Monroe Doctrine, which reinforces isolation of the western hemisphere, and leads to military skirmishes against Barbary Pirates and a second war with England to promote "freedom of the seas” and America's commercial interests.  America also evidences an early and enthusiastic interest in westward expansion and a desire to consolidate the North American continent under the umbrella of the United States government. This expansion is accomplished through diplomacy, purchase, emigration of American citizens, armed confrontation, and exploitation of civil unrest.  America negotiates away or seizes territory from the Native Americans, Spanish, and the Canadians, purchases territory from France and Russia, populates territories belonging to Spain, Mexico, and France with American émigrés, invades Mexico, makes multiple threats of war against Canada, and exploits civil unrest in Florida, Texas, California, the Pacific Northwest, and the Indian Territories.

During the American Civil War, the United States federal government promotes international isolation until the civil unrest can be put down.  The "federalist" United States government uses both diplomacy and military threat to insure foreign nations keep their distance from American territory.  The government of the Confederate States is more interested than the federal government in seeking diplomatic and commercial allies, but the confederates, like the federals, also seek to make sure foreign adventurers do not exploit the civil unrest on the continent.

Following the Civil War, America continues its westward expansion on the North American continent and embarks on a period of foreign adventurism in the Pacific and the Orient.  America gradually catches the "manifest destiny" fever that grips Nineteenth-Century Europe and, with a media-induced popular quest for national glory, opens Japan and establishes a foothold in China to promote both western values and American commercial interests, and soon conquers a mini-empire for itself in the Pacific and the Caribbean in lopsided war with Spain.  Ironically, America still seeks to remain isolated from Europe.

American isolationism and neutrality is put to the test by World War I. During the early years of the European war, America maintains its neutrality, largely because Americans are divided in their ethnic loyalty, with nearly as many Americans supporting Germany and Austria as supporting England and France. Americans also fear domestic economic prosperity would be threatened if America joins in the fighting.  Largely through efforts of British propaganda and the work of British secret agents, America is convinced to enter the war on the side of the Western European allies, seeing the war as a great adventure and as the heroic return of Americans to the soil of their ancestors.  America seems poised to take leadership in building a world-wide alliance for peace following World War I, under the banner of the League of Nations, but, in the domestic political struggle that follows the war, American internationalists loose to the isolationists and America enters another period of isolation and neutrality.  World War II is well under way, with America serving only a limited commercial and industrial role, until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brings America out of its isolation.  America quickly becomes the industrial arsenal for the allied free world's counter-attack on fascism and is, itself, a highly armed military giant in that counter-attack.  America continues to lead the "free world" attack against dictatorship once the fascist dictators are vanquished, turning the free world's attention to communist dictatorship. Since the end of World War II, America remains actively involved in world affairs, playing a dominant role in many international conflicts, intervening in domestic civil wars, promoting American-style "freedom," "democracy" and "materialism" around the world, protecting American geopolitical interests, and fulfilling America's new  manifest destiny as leader of a "new world order."

Throughout these shifts from isolationism to internationalism and from neutrality to intervention, America justifies its foreign policy decisions using sixteen basic principles. These principles are: (1) maintaining or building a "balance of power" in international alliances, (2) supporting Western political, economic and social values, (3) promoting or defending American national security and national autonomy, (4) extending American domestic social and economic policies abroad, (5) protecting or promoting American geopolitical interests, (6) exercising bureaucratic and political expedience, (7) giving vent to the personal beliefs, emotional states, and personal ambitions of America's top governmental and non-governmental leaders, (8) acquiescing to limitations imposed by the decision-making process, (9) maintaining non-entanglement or cautious entanglement with Europe, (10) promoting freedom of the seas, of commerce, and of citizen mobility, (11) maintaining a protective tariff, (12) settling international disputes through the most peaceful and least violent means possible, (13) protecting the nations of Western Europe, (14) protecting the nations of the Western Hemisphere, (15) perpetuating existing nations and regimes, and (16) maintaining an insular outlook on the world.

Most of these principles clearly reflect American self-interests, but some reflect important moral values that transcend mere self-interest.  For example, promoting freedom of the seas, peaceful settlement of disputes, perpetuating existing regimes, and protecting the nations of Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere are principles of basic morality and idealism.  American President Woodrow Wilson is one of the leading proponents of the moralist or idealist school of international relations.  He believes rational dialogue, democratic decision-making at the national and international levels, non-violence, and international cooperation are keys to attaining the higher moral goals of global peace and the full realization of mankind's potential.   But, even Wilson understands that, sometimes, high moral principles must give way to brute strength and raw power in order to achieve higher moral goals.  Wilson's address to Congress asking for a declaration of war in April 1917 clearly shows this mixture of idealism tempered with realism.

"When I addressed the Congress on the twenty-sixth of February last I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence.  But  armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable....  There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making; we will not chose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our Nation and our people to be ignored or violated.  The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very  roots of  human  life.....

Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of  the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and  self-governing peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will  henceforth insure the observance of those principles,  Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and  the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments  backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not the will of their  people.  We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances....

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations.  No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or  observe its covenants.  It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion.  Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart.  Only free  peoples can hold their purpose and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of  their own.

The right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have  always carried nearest our hearts-- for democracy, for the right of those who submit to  authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and liberties of small  nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring  peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free...." (Wilson,  Address to  Congress, 1917)

Foreign policy "realists" argue these sixteen basic principles are merely a smoke screen obscuring the one true justification for all foreign policy initiatives.  That one single and true justification for all foreign policy decisions and actions is the quest for power.  Hans J. Morgenthau,  the leading proponent of the "realist" school of foreign policy, believes those in the "idealist" school are merely deceiving themselves when they claim foreign policy is based on principles of justice, morality, peace, or mutual benefit.

"International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.  Whatever the ultimate aims of  international politics, power is always the immediate aim.  Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself.  They may define their  goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic, or social ideal,  They may hope this  ideal will materialize through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or through  the natural development of human affairs.  They may also try to further its realization  through nonpolitical means, such as technical co-operation with other nations or  international organizations.  But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of  international politics, they do so by striving for power. "  (Morgenthau, 1960, 3)

Morgenthau differs with President Wilson's assumptions concerning the ability of mankind to ever achieve a rational, peaceful world.

" The history of modern political thought is the story of a contest between two schools that differ fundamentally in their conceptions of the nature of man, society, and politics.   One believes that a rational  and moral political order, derived from universally valid  abstract principles, can be achieved here and now.  It assumes the essential goodness  and infinite malleability of human nature, and blames the failure of the social order to measure up to the rational standards on lack of knowledge and understanding, obsolescent social  institutions, or the depravity of certain isolated individuals or groups.

It trusts in education,  reform, and the sporadic use of force to remedy these defects.

The other school believes that the world, imperfect  as it is from the rational point of  view, is the result of forces inherent in human nature.  To improve the world one must  work with those forces, not against them.  This being inherently a world of opposing  interests and of conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realized, but  must at best be approximated through the ever precarious settlement of conflicts.  This  school, then, sees in a system of checks and balances a universal principle of all pluralist  societies.  It appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract principles, and aims at  the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good...."  (Morgenthau, 1960,10)

American foreign policy during the past 200 years, and more, is based on a combination of both moralist/idealist principles and realist principles.  Idealist foreign policy-makers are concerned with how nations ought to conduct their foreign affairs and attempt to develop foreign policies that promote human well-being.  Realist foreign policy-makers are concerned only with the actual facts of how nations do conduct their foreign policy and attempt to formulate foreign policies that promote national interests.

Idealists emphasize legalism and legal obligations between nations and believe treaties can resolve problems.  The Kellogg-Briand Treaty of the 1920s outlawing war is an example of idealist belief that treaties and law have practical substance.  Realists, on the other hand, see law as just so much paper, to be discarded when national interests come in conflict with law.  Idealists believe law is a substitute for power.  Realists believe law depends on the exercise of power; law is only as good as its enforcement.

Idealists base foreign policy on basic values and goals and a belief that all societies share basic values and goals.  One such value is national self-determination. Unfortunately, the idealist belief in national self-determination is not a goal shared by imperialist colonializing nations or nations with mercantilist economic systems.  The realist accepts the reality of dominance, subordination, conquest, exploitation and dependency.  Idealists believe intervention is appropriate in support of important human values.  They encourage, for example, intervention to prevent geonicide or promote human rights.  Realists understand such intervention is likely to fail if the value of human rights is not firmly engrained in the national character of the foreign society being intervened upon.

Idealists assume common agreement on basic terms and concepts.  Realists assume terms and concepts mean different things in different contextes. Realists understand, for example, that "democracy" means "popular sovereignty" and "one-man-one-vote" to an American Democrat, and that the same word means consent for a "dictatorship of the proletariate" to a Soviet Communist.

Idealists believe nations can stand alone, in isolation, concerned only with domestic improvement.  Realists believe all nations are interdependent and that preoccupation with the affairs of other nations is necessary, and direct intervention in those affairs is often required.  The nation that stands alone, dies alone.  Idealists believe America can influence world affairs without intervention through use of the power of example.  For decades, the United States policy toward international affairs is "neutrality,"   "no entangling alliances," and the "free hand" of discretion to make our own foreign policies in disregard for world events.  The result of this idealist position is the War of 1912, World War I, World War II, and the infamous "Cold War."

Realists also have their version of isolationism.  The nation's overseas commitments and interventions are limited to those directly promoting national security, American economic well-being, or some other vital national interest.  National power is invoked only to further national interests, not the interests of allies, the Third World, or the international community.  American power is applied selectively and with discimination.

Idealists are both isolationist and interventionist, depending on the value or ideal involved.  Realists are also both isolationist and interventionist, depending on the presence or absence of a vital national interest.

American foreign policy reflects both idealist and realist principles.  But, in the final analysis, whether implemented by idealists or realists, that foreign policy is based on sixteen basic principles which dominate American foreign policy decision-making during the nations' 200 year history.

Principle 1:

Maintaining or Restoring an International "Balance of Power"

"Balance of power," as an international relations concept, is an outgrowth of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries. The nations of Europe become convinced the only way to prevent France, or any other European nation, from making another attempt to conquer a European empire is to create a series of perfectly balanced alliances. The power of each of the separate individual alliances is perfectly balanced by the power of each other individual alliance.  No one alliance can conquer any one other alliance.  No combination of alliances can conquer any combination of the remaining alliances. The power of each of the individual alliances is so perfectly balanced that no one alliance can successfully aggress on any of the other alliances.  In addition to a balance of alliances, there is also a balance among the individual nations so no one nation can defeat any other nation.  Under a balance-of-power system, each state maximizes its ability to arm and defend itself.   Warfare is possible, but also irrational, even useless, in attempting to achieve state objectives.  Under a balance-of-power system, cooperation and mutual accommodation among states is encouraged, and the continued, perpetual existence of each state is virtually guaranteed.

"The 'balance of power' international system is characterized by the operation of the  following essential rules, which constitute the characteristic behavior of the system: (1)  increase capabilities, but negotiate rather than fight; (2) fight rather than fail to increase capabilities; (3) stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential actor; (4) oppose and  coalition or single actor that tends to assume a position of predominance within the  system; (5) constrain actors who subscribe to supranational  organizational principles; and  (6) permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the system as  acceptable role partners, or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the  essential actor classification.  Treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners.

The first two rules of the 'balance of power' international system reflect the fact that no  political sub-system exists within the international social system.  Therefore, essential  national actors must rely upon themselves or upon their allies for protection.  However, if  they are weak, their allies may desert them.  Therefore, an essential national actor must  ultimately be capable of protecting its own national values.  The third essential rule  illustrates the fact that other nations are valuable as potential allies.  In addition, nationality  may set limits on potential expansion.

The fourth and fifth rules give recognition to the fact that a predominant coalition or  national actor would constitute a threat to the interests of other national actors.  Moreover,  if a coalition were to become predominant, then the largest member of that coalition might  also become predominant over the lesser members of its own coalition.  For this reason  members of a successful coalition may be alienated; they may also be able to bargain for   more from the losers than from their own allies.

The sixth rule states that membership in the system is dependent upon only behavior  that corresponds with the essential rules or norms of the 'balance of power' system.  If the  number of essential actors is reduced, the 'balance of power' international system will  become unstable.  Therefore, maintaining the number of essential national actors above a  critical lower bound is a necessary condition for the stability of the system.  This is best  done by returning to full membership in the system defeated actors or reformed deviant  actors."  (Kaplan, 469)

The power resources factored into determining the balance of power in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries include total population size, military-age population size, industrial capacity, military equipment (ships, artillery pieces, airplanes, tanks, etc.), number of men in the standing military and in the reserves, mobilization time, and control of strategic geography.

Until World War I, the United States avoids being included in European balance of power calculations. World War I proves that a balance of power can successfully prevent any aggressor nation, or any combination of aggressor nations, from achieving military victory over non-aggressor  nations.  The Europeans fight themselves to a bloody stalemate. Neither side can win;  conversely, neither side can loose.  The entry of the United States into the war, tips the balance of power and is considered by many historians to be the decisive factor in the final outcome of the war.  During the post-war period, America withdraws from active involvement in European alliance-building activities but does participate in several world-wide arms control and arms limitation conferences intended to reduce the absolute power of each of the alliances while maintaining the relative balance of power among the alliances.  In World War II, American resources and manpower prove, once again, to be the decisive factor in determining the final outcome of the war. Since World War II, America is a major proponent of, and participant in, global balance of power politics. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) balances the Warsaw Bloc nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Bloc eventually fall under the burden of the arms race to keep up with the Americans and Europeans; the South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) balances the growing Communist Chinese, Soviet, North Korean, and North Vietnamese military power until the Communist block tips the balance in its favor by overrunning most of the SEATO allies in Asia.  The United States government is an active participant and leader in both of these alliances and in scores of other alliances designed to balance "The West" against "The East" in economic, military, and cultural power.

One of the essential elements of a balance of power system is "deterrence."  Deterrence is probably best understood as "giving as good as you get" so that a potential "bullying" nation begins to see there is no advantage to engaging in bullying behavior.

"It is important to distinguish three types of deterrence.  The first of these is: Type I  Deterrence, or deterrence against a direct attack... Typically, discussion of the capability  of the United States to deter a direct attack compare the pre-attack inventory...  that is,  the number of planes, missiles, army divisions, and submarines of the two countries are  directly compared.  This is the World War I and World War II approach.

The really essential numbers, however, are estimates of the damage that the retaliatory  forces can inflict after being hit....

Type II Deterrence is defined as using strategic threats to deter an enemy from engaging in very provocative acts other than a direct attack on the United States itself....   Type II Deterrence will involve the possibility the United States will obtain the first strike... in retaliation for a... provocation....

Type III Deterrence might be called 'tit-for-tat deterrence.'  It refers to those acts that are deterred because the potential aggressor is afraid that the defender or others will then  take limited actions, military or nonmilitary, that will make aggression unprofitable

The most obvious threat that we could muster under Type III Deterrence would be the capability to fight a limited war of some sort."  (Kahn, 225-237)

Even with the development of nuclear weapons, nations still think in terms of balance of power;  each of the two super-power alliances during the now-defunct "Cold War" seeks to balance the other's nuclear arsenal bomb-for-bomb until each alliance is capable of destroying the other alliance many times over. Balance of power is finally reduced to "mutual assured destruction," a balance of power that assures each super-power will be able to destroy each other in the next global war.

"The United States and the Soviet Union continue to be locked into a cycle of open-ended weapons competition in both the nuclear and conventional armaments field.  They do so in the belief that, given the absence of confidence in one another's pledges and stated intentions, security can only be vouchsafed through a balance of nuclear forces."   (Lewis, 25)

In addition to being able to destroy the other, each super-power must be unable to fully protect itself from the other.  Each must be able to destroy just enough of the others arsenal to make the other uncertain of their ability to launch either a successful first strike or a successful counter strike.  At the same time,  each must be able to protect just enough of its arsenal to be able to successfully launch at least a partial first strike or partial counter strike. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and presidential arms control advisor Paul Nitze describe defense tactics of the 1980s.

"Defensive technologies... must, at minimum, be able to destroy a sufficient portion of an aggressor's attacking forces so as to deny him either confidence in the outcome of his attack or the ability to destroy a credible portion of the targets he wishes to destroy....  Any  effective defensive system definitely must be both survivable and cost-effective,"  (Perle,  23-24)

"Survivable and cost-effective defenses could so complicate a potential attacker's planning for a first strike that such an attack could not be seriously contemplated and deterrence would thus be significantly enhanced."  (Nitze, 265).

Balance of power, as a principle in foreign policy, may have limited value in the Twenty-first Century.  First, growing global reliance on terrorism and surprise commando strikes directed against key targets, and the availability of weapons of mass destruction which can be wielded by small teams of aggressors is difficult to counter with a "balance of power." The days of mass armies, masses of firepower, and the massing of military hardware are over.  Modern military tactics call for small forces with quick maneuverability armed with very powerful precision weapons capable of striking small targets.  The power of a massive army is easily balanced by a single nuclear weapon with a pin-point delivery system or a single nuclear weapon hand delivered in a suitcase.  Second, the possibility of constructing a strategic defense shield, as envisioned by President Ronald Reagan in his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), may soon be a reality.  SID makes a nation impenetrable to attack by any nation using conventional or nuclear arms.  Third, the "new world order" may see the globe dominated by one single superpower and each hemisphere dominated by one preeminent nation-state; in such a system, lesser states may feel compelled to seek the protection of the one most powerful state rather than forming alliances independent of that state. On the other hand, there appears to be an emerging go-it-alone attitude in America that may eventually pit the one superpower against all the combined mass of power of all the other nations of the world.

In a study of "secondary" states, Kenneth Waltz finds that, rather than joining with the stronger side or the one most powerful state, states prefer to join with the weaker coalition.

"The first concern of states is not  to maximize power but to maintain their position in the  system.  Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them.  On the weaker side they are both more appreciated and safer, providing, of course, that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking....

(O)ne predicts a strong tendency toward balance in the system. The expectation is not that a balance, once achieved, will be maintained, but that a balance, once disrupted, will  be restored in one way or another.  Balances of power recurrently form."  (Waltz, in Ikenberry, 105-106)

There is clear reluctance for states to take a potentially subservient position under the protection of a most-powerful super state and a clear willingness for states to build coalitions independent of that super state.  This tendency, coupled with the long history of balance-of-power politics and the intuitive appeal of balance of power as an organizing principle for international relations, should insure "balance of power" will be a major  justification  for foreign policy decisions well into the future.

Some experts argue, however, that balance of power is not as useful in preventing armed warfare as its proponents claim.

"The relationship between peace and the balance of power appears to be exactly the opposite of what has been claimed.  The periods of balance, real or imagined, are periods of warfare, while the periods of known preponderance are periods of peace....

The claim that a balance of power is conducive to peace does not stand up.  Indeed, it is  not even logical.  It stands to reason that nations will not fight unless they believe they  have a good chance of winning, but this is true for both sides only when the two are fairly  evenly matched, or at least when they believe they are.  Thus a balance of power  increases the chances of war.  A preponderance of power on one side, on the other  hand, increases the chances for peace, for the greatly stronger side need not fight at all to  get what it wants...."  (Organski, 292)

President Ronald Reagan abandons the policy of balance of power and deterrence and the policy of mutual assured destruction, both popular during the 1960s and 1970s, and pursues a policy of unilateral American military superiority and, through the strategic defense initiative, a policy of unilateral national security.  His actions bring the collapse of the Soviet Union and a period of peace among the essential global actors.  Perhaps the critics of balance-of-power international politics are correct when they claim that balance of power brings war and that preponderance of power brings peace-- at least in those cases where the preponderance of power is in the hands of those who would pursue moral and  ideal goals of peace, cooperation, and  the maximization of human potential.

Principle 2:

Support for Western Values

The foreign policy of nations usually reflects some degree of national ethnocentrism.  Ethnocentrism is belief in the superiority and correctness of one's own nation and the superiority and correctness of the nation's domestic and international policies. For example, the Imperial Chinese consider all peoples other than their own people to be barbarians.  The Republican and Imperial Romans consider all non-Roman and non-allied peoples to be uncivilized. The Christian nations of medieval Europe consider non-Christian peoples to be heathens and Godless, God-forsaken peoples.  The Nineteenth-century European colonial nations consider non-Western people to be morally, intellectually, and economically inferior­even child-like.  All these great world powers deal with foreign nations and foreign people from a position of assumed superiority. The United States is also guilty of this behavior.

Throughout the history of the United States, Americans express a broad consensus of support for liberal, democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values, dubbed "the American Creed" by social scientist Gunnar Myrdal.   American foreign policy assumes that the form of pluralist, capitalist, individualistic, egalitarian, republican government practiced in the United States is inherently superior to other forms of government; it may even be a God-given form of government.

"For most Americans...foreign-policy goals should reflect not only the security interests of the nation and the economic interests of key groups within the nation but also the political values and principles that define American identity....  Hence the recurring  tendencies in American history, either to retreat to minimum relations with the rest of the  world... or... to set forth on a crusade to purify the world, to bring it into accordance with American principles...."  (Huntington, in Ikenberry, 240)

Throughout American history, Americans export American beliefs, values and behaviors in an effort to bring the blessings of American-style government and Western civilization to the rest of the people of the world. First, Americans export American values, norms, expectations and behaviors to the Native American tribes, to the occupants of Spanish controlled territories, and to the Mormons settling the Intermountain West.  Later, America tries to recast the entire world in the American image.

The 1876 Republican Party platform summarizes the government's intentions to "westernize" all territory under its control.  The platform proclaims the party's intention to "secure... the supremacy of American institutions in all the territories."  The institution specifically mentioned as needing to be secure is monogamous marriage; "it is the right and the duty of congress to prohibit and extirpate in the territories that relic of barbarism, polygamy."   In the 1880 platform, Republicans equate polygamy to "its twin barbarity," slavery, and vow it must "die in the territories."

The Democrats are not always sure western values can be extended successfully into all territories.  When successful transfer is unlikely, Democrats urge American withdrawal from the territory.  This appears to be the case in the Philippines.  In their 1900 and 1904 party platforms, Democrats describe the Filipino people in unflattering terms.

"We are not opposed to territorial expansion when it takes in desirable territory which can be erected into States in the Union, and whose people are willing and fit to become  American citizens....  But we are unalterably opposed to seizing distant islands to be  governed outside the Constitution, and whose people can never become citizens."

The Filipinos cannot become citizens without endangering our civilization; they cannot be subjects without imperiling our form of government; and as we are not willing to surrender our civilization nor to convert the Republic into an empire, we favor (giving) the Filipinos, first a stable form of government; second, independence; and third, protection  from outside interference."  (1900 Democratic  Party Platform)

"We believe, with Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, that no Government has a  right to make one set of laws for those 'at home' and another and a different set of  laws, absolute in their character, for those 'in the colonies.'  All men under the American flag are entitled to the protection of the institutions whose emblem the flag  is; if they are inherently unfit for those institutions, then they are inherently unfit to be members of the American body politic,  Wherever there may exist a people incapable of being governed under American laws, in consonance with the American Constitution, the territory of that people ought not to be part of the American domain.   We insist that we ought to... set the Filipino people upon their feet, free and independent, to work out their own destiny."  (1904 Democratic Party Platform)

While the United States government does not often actively intervene to support liberal and republican revolutions in nations around the world, American politicians and American political parties often provide moral support to these movements.  The platforms of the major political parties contain abundant references to support for western values around the world.  The Democratic Party platform of 1848 supports the French liberal revolution of 1848 and likens the French revolution to America's own revolution of 1776.  The Whig platform of 1852 also expresses support for the liberal movements throughout Europe, but emphasizes that the value of non-entanglement takes priority.

"That while struggling freedom everywhere enlists the warmest sympathy of the Whig party, we still adhere to the doctrines of the Father of his Country,... of keeping ourselves free of all entangling alliances with foreign countries, and of  never quitting our own to stand upon foreign ground, that our mission as a republic  is not to propagate our opinions, or impose on other countries our form of government by artifice or force; but to teach, by example, and to show by our  success, moderation and justice, the blessings of self-government and the advantages of free institutions."  (1852 Whig Party Platform)

In the last half of the Nineteenth Century, political party platforms contain numerous references of support for western liberal values.  The 1868 Republican platform declares "This Convention declares its sympathy with all the oppressed people which are struggling for their rights."   In their 1892 party platform, the Democrats "condemn the oppression practiced by the Russian Government upon its Lutheran and Jewish subjects" and express sympathy with the revolutionaries in Ireland seeking independence for their nation from Great Britain.  In 1892, the Republicans also "protest against the persecution of Jews in Russia" and sympathize with the cause of home-rule in Ireland.  In the 1896 platforms, Republicans condemn "the massacres in Armenia" by the Turks and Democrats express "sympathy to the people of Cuba in their historic struggle for liberty and independence."   Of course, the United States intervenes in Cuba in support of the Cubans' liberty and independence, but remains non-interventionist toward the other global trouble spots.  In 1900, the Republicans claim their effort to mediate the conflict between Great Britain and the South African Republic is merely an effort to obtain a peaceful settlement of a dispute and is non-interventionist in the finest American tradition.  Both the Republican and Democrat platforms support the South Africans.  In their platform, the Democrats "view with indignation the purpose of England to overwhelm with force the South African Republics....  We extend our sympathies to the heroic burghers in their unequal struggle to maintain their liberty and independence."

Following World War I, both Democrats and Republicans give moral support to the independence movements throughout Europe.  The Democrat platform of 1920 expresses support for Irish "national self-determination"  support for efforts by the Armenians "to establish and maintain a government of their own," and "active sympathy with the people of China, Czecho-Slovakia, Finland, Poland, Persia, Jugo-Slavia and others who have recently established representative governments and who are striving to develop the institutions of Democracy."  The Democrats, under President Woodrow Wilson, seek a popular and congressional mandate for active intervention in Armenia.  Republicans "sympathize" with the Armenians but oppose intervention, using their 1920 party platform to describe Wilson's efforts at intervention as disregard of the lives of American boys or of American interest."

In the early Twentieth Century, America becomes more active in protecting and promoting western values in World War I and World War II, making the world safe for democracy, and, through President Wilson's call for a League of Nations, promoting the American notion that the world could be made peaceful and prosperous if the world would simply accept the American notions of cooperation, stable political order, gradual economic change,  and democratic decision-making.  "Wilsonianism... may be described as a conscious attempt to redefine United States Foreign policy to restructure international order in close connection with domestic order." (Iriye, in Ikenberry, p. 324).   The domestic policies that brought peace and prosperity to America could bring the same peace and prosperity to the rest of the world.

During the middle and late Twentieth Century, the United States becomes active in support of nationalistic and pro-western movements throughout the globe, especially during the "Cold War" with the Soviet Union.  However, American activity often takes a more covert than overt form.  America is more likely to send aid to the anti-communist forces than to send American troops, and is more likely to intervene in the name of national security than to admit to an overt desire to support western values.   There are actually several cases, including the Katanga independence movement in the Congo and the civil war in 1980s and 1990s Cambodia and Laos, when the United States actually gives support to the less-pro-Western forces.

The blessings of American beliefs and values are provided throughout the world through military conquest, the Marshall Plan, religious missionary activity, the American University abroad, development banking institutions and a host of other means. Once the peoples of the world see the benefits America can provide, many of the leaders of foreign nations seek to emulate American values, norms, expectations, and behaviors in an effort to secure for themselves the foreign aid  and military aid blessings that come with "westernization."

Once a portion of the foreign nation's population accepts American values and norms, the United States government often defends these enclaves diplomatically, as in the case of the Shah of Iran, militarily, as in the case of South Vietnam, or financially, as in the case of Israel. The acceptance of American values by foreign governments and people, brings to these nations and these people American foreign aid, development bank loans, American business entrepreneurs and investors, American tourists, the Peace Corps, and the moral support of the American people. The rejection of American values brings declining foreign trade and foreign aid, public hostility, disapproval, ridicule and abandonment.

From the Renaissance until the 1970s, the "Western" nations are aggressors in the world of ideas, values, and morals. Christianity, capitalism, participatory government, consumerism, socialism, materialism, industrialism, and the sciences­ both the social sciences and the natural sciences­ are actively promoted for adoption around the world, and are, in some cases, forced upon the nations and people of the world. In the 1960s and 1970s, the non-western world counterattacked.  Native religions challenged or modified Christianity; Islam began to aggress against Christianity and modernism; communalism and cooperation challenged capitalism; enlightened authoritarianism challenged democracy; socialism and minimalism challenged materialism and consumerism; environmentalism challenged industrialism; appropriate technology challenged high technology;  and "new age" mysticism and a return to traditional folklore challenged science.

In spite of the counter-attack, as the Twenty-first Century opens, the United States continues to support the adoption of "Western" values abroad and continues to reward those nations adopting American-style values, institutions and life-styles. In Afghanistan and Iraq, America is even willing to use armed force to encourage the introduction of western cultural and political values.

Principle 3:

Protecting National Security and National Autonomy

If  the United States is to survive for long in the often predatory international world of nation-states, the United States must give primary concern for the factors that insure its national survival.  America must be able to defend and secure its borders, maintain its territorial integrity, maintain access to key raw materials and commercial trading partners, defend geographic positions of defensive and offensive strategic importance, be secure in its national secrets, hide its weaknesses from its enemies, defend its citizens and protect its young.  America must be able to define national goals and have some degree of assurance those national goals can be achieved, must be able to define itself as a nation-state different from and apart from other nation-states, and must be able to develop and maintain its military and industrial strength.

National security and national autonomy are issues related to the organic state itself-- to the state as an entity distinct from the  people that populate the state.

 "In a very vague and general way 'national interest' does suggest a direction of policy which can be distinguished from several others which may present themselves as alternatives.  It indicates that the policy is designed to promote demands which are ascribed to the nation rather than to individuals, sub-national groups or mankind as a whole."  (Wolfers, 481)

According to structural-functional theory, all organizations, including all nation-states, must maintain access to resources, must maintain their boundaries, must be able to self-perpetuate themselves, and must have the ability to achieve goals the organization believes to be important if the organization is to survive.  The drive to survive is paramount in all perpetual organizations, including nation-states. Organizational and national security are, therefore, high priority concerns for the national organization.

"Any foreign policy which operates under the standard of the national interest must obviously have some reference to the physical, political, and cultural entity which we call a nation. In a world where a number of sovereign nations compete with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies of all nations must necessarily refer to their survival as their minimum requirements.  Thus all nations do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations....

The concept of the national interest... assumes continuous conflict and threat of war, to be minimized through the continuous adjustment of conflicting interests by diplomatic action.  No such assumption would be warranted if all nations at all times conceived of  their national interest only in terms of their survival and, in turn, defined their interest in survival in restrictive and rational terms.  As it is, their conception of the national interest is  subject to all the hazards of misrepresentation, usurpation, and misjudgment ...  To minimize these hazards is the first task of a foreign policy which seeks the defense of the national interest by peaceful means.  Its second task is the defense of the national  interest, restrictively and rationally defined, against the national interests of other nations...."  (Morgenthau, 1952, 961-976)

A "nation" is a group of people with shared history, shared identity and shared goals and aspirations.  A 'state" is the organized organization of power within a geographic territory.  In the modern  world of "representative government," nations and states have been combined.   Nations assert their identities and aspirations through the state, which they have come to dominate through election to positions of power in the state.  But, national interest is more than the representation of these sub-national interests.

"The legitimacy of the national interest must be determined in the face of possible usurpation by subnational, other-national, and supranational interests.  On the subnational level we find group interests, represented particularly by ethnic and economic groups, who tend to identify themselves with the national interest....Yet, the concept of the national interest which emerges from this contest of conflicting sectional interests is also more than any particular sectional interest or their sum total."  (Morgenthau, 1952, 965-970)

The defense of national values, the achievement of national objectives and the assurance of national integrity and national autonomy in the face of other nation-states, is at the very heart of the definition of "nation-state."   Each nation has "core values" which establish its identify, determine its objectives, and constitute the defining essence of its being.  These core values satisfy national pride, heighten national self-esteem, reduce national fears, define the essence of the nation.  A nation is secure to the extent that its national values are secure and are not threatened with sacrifice to the values of another state, or threatened with sacrifice to the needs of national security itself.

"Traditionally, the protection and preservation of national core values have been  considered ends in themselves....  When one sets out to define in terms of expedience  the level of security to which a nation should aspire, one might be tempted to assume that  the sky is the limit....  Yet, there are obvious reasons why this is not so.

In the first place, every increment of security must be paid by additional sacrifices of other values.... At a certain point, then, by something like the economic law of diminishing returns, the gain in security no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it....

In the second place, national security policies when based on the accumulation of power have a way of defeating themselves...  This is due to the fact that 'power of resistance' cannot be unmistakably distinguished from 'power of aggression.'  What a  country does to bolster its own security through power can be interpreted by others,  therefore, as a threat to their security... The vicious circle of... 'security dilemma' sets in: the efforts of one side provoke countermeasures by the other which in turn  tend to wipe  out the gains of the first."  (Wolfers, 490- 495)

One of America's core values is "toleration."  But in the face of subversive activities from, for example, Moslem clerics entering America from abroad, how much toleration will be extended, to these Moslem clerics when it becomes known they are using American toleration to threaten American  national security?   And, how much toleration is America willing to sacrifice to silence the Moslem clerics before America sacrifices the entire core value of toleration?  Of course, if America is successfully subverted by the Moslem clerics, America is lost and the core value of toleration is also lost.

The term "national security" implies the nation's ability to defend its territory and its interests and  the nation's ability to maintain geographic separation between itself and other nation-states. The term "national autonomy" implies a higher-level ability of the nation-state to define itself as separate from and distinct from all other nation-states, to select and defend its national values, and to achieve its national objectives.  It is possible a nation may have national security but not national autonomy.  Examples include most Warsaw Bloc nations during the period of Soviet hegemony.  Each Warsaw Bloc nation is reasonably able to maintain its territorial integrity but its national definition and national values come from Moscow.  When individual Warsaw Bloc nations seek self-definition, as is the case in the "Hungarian Revolt" of the mid-1950s, the nations quickly find their national security violated by Soviet tanks.

America struggles  with self-definition in the decades before the revolution which brought political independence from England.  England seeks to define America as a colonial dependency and mercantilist resource base and market; the Americans seek to define themselves as a self-sufficient entity roughly equal to England.  The American Revolution can be seen as a contest to decide which definition will hold.  The United States of America jealously defends its right to self-definition after political independence, including in the years leading up to the War of 1812.  Any attempt by any nation to impose a definition of America on America is vigorously rejected and is still rejected today. For example, America refuses to accept Japan's definition of America as an economic dependency of Japan and counters the flood of 1970s and 1980s Japanese imports with tariffs, protests and a national commercial and industrial revival.

For a nation to maintain national autonomy, the nation must be able to maintain national security. Like national autonomy, national security must be defined by the nation itself.  No amount of assurances from parents and friends makes a fearful child feel secure; only the child can make himself feel secure.  The child defines, for himself, the parameters which will result in a sense of personal security.  It is the same with nation-states.  No amount of assurances from the United Nations or the world's superpowers can make a nation feel secure; the nation must have the resources and ability to insure its own security.  These autonomy and security drives are at the heart of America's need for military superiority, need for visible military, commercial and diplomatic presence around the world, and need to insure that all nations in control of strategic geography and strategic resources are "friendly" to the United States. These drives are at the heart of America's refusal to relinquish its veto power in the United States Security Council and its caution in negotiating and approving arms reduction agreements.

The concern for national autonomy and national security is seen in a wide range of American foreign policy actions.  The Monroe Doctrine, for example, is both a statement of support for the national autonomy and national security of the other nations of the Western Hemisphere and a statement for the autonomy and security of the United States itself.  This national autonomy-national security intention is seen in the words of the 1856 Democratic Party platform.  After discussing the value of the Monroe Doctrine, the platform continues:

"Resolved... that every proper effort be made to insure our ascendancy in the Gulf  of Mexico, and to maintain a permanent protection of the great outlets through which are  emptied into its waters the products created by the industry of the people of our Western  valleys and the Union at large."  (1856 Democratic Party Platform)

Even in the midst of the Civil War, the national security implications of the Monroe Doctrine find their way into the Republican Party platform of 1864 when the Republicans signal their opposition to French efforts to conquer Mexico and place a European archduke on a throne in Mexico.

"The people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any  European Power to overthrow by force or supplant by fraud the institutions of any Republican Government on the Western Continent and that they will view with extreme jealousy, as menacing to the peace and independence of their own country,  the efforts of any such power to obtain new footholds of Monarchical Government,  sustained by foreign military force, in near proximity to the United States."  (1864  Republican Party Platform)

Those same words could be used to describe American attitudes toward European attempts to seize Haiti and some Central American countries for failure to repay international debts in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries and the Soviet Union's attempts to establish a European military presence in Cuba and Nicaragua in the Twentieth Century.

A claim to national autonomy-national security is made when President Woodrow Wilson authorizes the use of American troops to intervene in a Mexican civil war in the months leading up to World War I.  The Democrat administration claims military action is necessary to suppress "Mexican bandits and self-styled revolutionaries"  who are creating a crisis in the border area between the United States and Mexico.  The nationwide Mexican revolution has support and strongholds in northern Mexico; these loosely organized revolutionaries often venture into American territory to obtain guns, military supplies, and subsistence supplies, often taking the supplies by force.  In their 1916 party platform, Democrats attempt to justify their incursion into Mexico in national security terms while attempting to also reassure the other nations of Latin America.

"The Monroe Doctrine... guarantees the independent republics of the two Americas against aggression from another continent.  It implies, as well, the most scrupulous regard upon our part for the sovereignty of each of them....  We seek not to despoil them. The want of a stable, responsible government in Mexico, capable of repressing and punishing marauders and bandit bands, who have... invaded our  soil, made war upon and murdered our people... has rendered it necessary  temporarily to occupy, by our armed forces, a portion of the territory of that friendly state."  (1916 Democratic Party Platform)

Republicans, however, do not concur that national security issues are involved in this case.  In their 1916 platform Republicans acknowledge the outrages committed by the bandits but "denounce the indefensible methods of interference employed by this administration in the internal affairs of Mexico."    In the late Twentieth Century, Republican President George Bush borrows President Wilson's justification in Mexico and argues that the Panamanian government's inability to suppress illegal drug traffic into the United States, and the threat of that drug traffic to national autonomy and national security, is justification for a United States invasion of Panama and the incarceration of the Panamanian president

Principle 4:

Domestic Public Policies Extended Abroad

The domestic policies developed and enacted into law to govern the social, economic and political relationships among Americans are often promoted abroad through America's foreign policy initiatives.   This is clearly seen in President Woodrow Wilson's attempt to export American domestic relations to the remainder of the world through the establishment of the League of Nations, as previously discussed under  the "Support for Western Values" principle.

But, this extension of domestic values abroad goes beyond mere exportation of "the American Creed" abroad; it extends to specific items of public policy-- to specific laws, rules, and regulations.  Once Americans, through the political process, agree on a just interrelationship among citizens and develop domestic policies and enact domestic legislation that Americans consider to be good, proper and morally appropriate, there is an effort to impose that "just" relationship on all peoples of the world.  Once Americans decide on the best public policy for themselves, they often attempt to bestow the virtues and benefits of those policies on the rest of the world, even if the rest of the world does not view those policies as good, proper or morally appropriate, and even if those policies run counter to the religious beliefs and social and economic traditions, norms, and values of individual foreign nations.  For example, once Americans agree on just child labor practices, on just pay practices, and on just factory working conditions, those practices are promoted abroad through foreign policy initiatives.  Foreign acceptance of these practices is often a precondition for beginning or continuing commercial relations with America.  If foreign nation-states want to continue commercial relations with the United States, they have little choice than to modify their own conceptions of morality and justice concerning child labor, appropriate wage rates, and "sweatshops," and to conform to American conceptions of morality and justice on those issues.  Of course, every time a foreign nation-state makes such an adjustment, the nation must sacrifice some small portion of their nationhood and their national autonomy, so such adjustments are likely to come reluctantly and with protest. Those adjustments also often disrupt the existing social and economic relationships within the nation, creating new inequalities of privilege, pay, and life-styles.

Throughout history,  the United States promotes its domestic policies of capitalism and economic exchange, child and labor protection, right-to-life, Bill of Rights freedoms, racial equity, environmental protection, humane treatment of animals, copyrights, and a host of other domestic policies. Adherence to American domestic policies is often a condition for receiving American foreign aid, most-favored-nation trade status, and cultural and education exchanges.  Nations refusing to adopt American domestic policies as their own occasionally find themselves cut off from American support or find themselves the subject of covert and overt American pressures, including assassination efforts by the Central Intelligence Agency and American support for rebellious forces within their national boundaries.  As American domestic policies change, so does American support for individual foreign regimes, international cooperation projects, heads of state, and rebel forces.  For example, when the United States is domestically concerned with law-and-order and repression of terrorist activities, law-and-order and anti-terrorist regimes and political leaders throughout the world receive U. S. support, even authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.  When United States domestic policies shift toward increased civil liberties and rights for the accused, the law-and-order regimes and political leaders previously supported come under criticism and replacement regimes and political figures are given American support.

In some cases, even relatively narrow and specific domestic issues become the subject for promotion through foreign policy.  When President  Ronald Reagan's administration takes a domestic stand against artificial birth control and abortion, foreign assistance project funds for both birth control and abortion are cut from foreign aid to individual foreign nations, even nations with domestic policies supporting artificial birth control and abortion.  Nations with domestic birth control policies, including Mexico, India and China, are criticized for maintaining these policies.  During the 1970s and 1980s, the United States denies some support and trading privileges to South Africa because of its domestic racial policies; once those policies change to reflect American domestic racial policies, the embargoes are lifted and support and trading privileges are restored.  The United States criticizes both Europe and Japan for their domestic policies of market protection and for their use of government subsidies to insure the health and survival of essential domestic industries.  The United States government takes foreign policy initiatives to force those nations to reconsider their domestic economic policies.   The Europeans and the Japanese eventually bring their domestic economic policies more into line with mixed free-market capitalism, as practiced in the United States.